Gujarat Carnage

&

 Judicial Redressal

A report submitted in FFCL board meeting

By 

Maulana Mohd. Fazlur Rahim, Chairman

• Randhikpur, situated in Limkheda taluk of Dahod district, is a small village of about 70-75 Muslims families and a few hundred of the Hindus.  Dwarfed by craggy hills on three sides this village is connected to Limkheda in the south and Sanjeli in the north by a thin potholed strip of tarred road. Several adivasi homesteads dot the landscape around Randhikpur. Most of the Muslims are poor landless agricultural labourers. Due to the prevalent drought conditions in the region many of them have taken to trading in livestock and petty business to earn a living. Randhikpur witnessed communal violence during 1998 when rumours about the abduction of hindu/adivasi girls by Muslim men were spread allegedly by members of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP).

• As houses and shops belonging to the minority community were looted and burnt, they had to migrate to Bariya in the neighbouring Panchmahals district. It was a good three months before negotiations with the Hindus resulted in their return to their homes. Randhikpur had witnessed at least one incident of serious communal violence in recent times – a good reason why the personnel stationed at the police outpost should have been more pro-active in preventing communal violence as required by The Bombay Police Act 1951, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the 1997 Ministry of Home Affairs Guidelines for Promoting Communal Harmony.

• Not all Muslim residents of Randhikpur had heard about the Godhra incident. Adbulla Ghanchi (mid forties) had no knowledge of the carnage that happened at Godhra. Yakub Ibrahim Ghanchi (22) was one of the few who heard about it the evening. Siraj Nana Patel (45) who lives in the lower section (nichwas) of the village had overheard a conversation about this incident that evening. None of them expected that the Godhra incident would impact upon their lives the same day.

• They all agreed  that  the first incident  of violence  occurred  around midnight. Siraj Nana Patel’s house was set on fire even as his  family was asleep inside. His sister Aishaben’s house in the upper part of the village (uparwas) was set on fire  around 0100  hours.  Neither  could identify  the  culprits as  it was  dark but  their  families   managed to escape  being  burnt   alive. The   houses of   Adambhai Ismail, Ayub Nana and Sattar Ismail in the same locality were also burnt down thesame night. As none of the residents heard any commotion or witnessed group activity the arsoning seems to have been committed by a few elements trying to foment trouble. These families did not contact the police outpost, as they were busy putting out the fire. Siraj Nana intended to make a complaint the following morning. His Hindu neighbour Rajubhai Lohar and Lalubhai an adivasi helped him extinguish the fire. It is highly unlikely that the police posted at the outpost was not aware of these incidents. A police outpost is generally staffed with one jamadar (Head Constable) and two Police Constables (PCs) in Gujarat. Even if one person is stationed at the outpost at least two policemen would have been available to visit the trouble spot and ascertain the cause of the fire. According to witnesses whom the team spoke to, the smoke from the houses was visible from the very ends of the village. The police should have arrived to ascertain the cause of the fire during the course of their night beats. Or this should have been sufficient cause for the police to alert higher authorities, especially considering the fact that the radio and TV channels had begun spreading news of the Gujarat bandh call given by the VHP and its allies for the 28th as a mark of protest against the Godhra incident. Instructions ought to have been issued to maintain strict vigil in places like Randhikpur, which had witnessed communal violence earlier. The police should have requisitioned more personnel from the Limkheda police station. As the police do not readily disclose information about deployment of personnel even during ordinary times it is difficult to ascertain whether this was done. It is also not clear as to what instructions had been issued by higher authorities and whether the same had been communicated by the Limkheda police station to the outpost in Randhikpur. The events of the next day as narrated by the victims indicate that no extra personnel were posted to protect the Muslim localities. Nor attempts seem to have been made to bring the leaders of both communities to discuss the express need to maintain peace. We need to find out whether Peace committees existed herein the past?

• Abdulla Isa Ghanchi was not aware of the bandh call given by the VHP and its allies.  Siraj appeared to have heard knowledge about it from the conversation he overheard the previous evening. Yakub had also heard about the bandh call. Not surprisingly, no azaan was heard at the usual morning hour the next day. It is not clear if any muslim went to the masjid to offer prayers. This indicates that there was a clear perception of threat within the minority community. Around 0900 hours,when Siraj was on his way to the bazaar situated in the lower part of Randhikpur, he saw a crowd of 300-400 people who had gathered before the temple of a Hindu goddess (Ambemata). They were chanting slogans and frequently shouting, “Ghanchi ne maaro, ghanchi nu baalo, kaapo!” (attack the Ghanchis, kill them and burn them!). The bandh call did not seem to have an effect as most of the shops had already opened for business.

• According to the The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988, the premises of a religious institution (which includes a Hindu temple) may not be used for “doing any act which promotes or attempts to promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities. These acts are classified as cognizable offences under the Indian Penal Code. Every police officer has the discretionary authority to take lawful action in order to prevent the commission of a cognizable offence.18 According to the testimonies provided by Abdulla, Siraj and Yakub no police personnel arrived onthe spot to disperse the mob. Nor did they hear any public announcements from the police or the Executive Magistrate (Mamlatdar) declaring the imposition of curfew in Randhikpur. We do not know if this was done at all. Even if it was done there is a strong possibility that it might have been done in retrospect.

• Siraj’s house was set on fire again around 1100 hours. Abdulla witnessed a 1000 strong mob stoning the masjid, which is located in the upper part of the village around 1100-11.30 hours. It appears that mobs had attacked the village from different directions as in several other places. Abdulla could not recognise anybody in the crowd. Siraj stated that most of the attackers belonged to the Hindu community residing in the village. Amongst them were several members of the VHP and the Bajrang Dal and he could recognise at least 10 individuals. But he refuses to identify them.

• Abdulla approached one of the jamadars (head constable?) manning the outpost - who had been posted recently - for help. He does not remember his name. Mehboobhai, Salambhai, Isubbhai, Fakirbhai and Sattarbhai had accompanied Abdulla to seek protection and shifting of all Muslim families to safe locations. The jamadar allegedly advised Abdulla and others to run for their lives if they wanted to escape the wrath of the mobs. A Police Sub-Inspector (PSI) (whom the victims could not identify) arrived from Limkheda in a jeep along with four Constables half an hour later. Abdulla remembers that all four constables were armed with rifles (probably .303) and the PSI with a revolver. By then the Muslim men had managed to send some of their womenfolk and children to the house of Kakadiyabhai Sattarbhai Sanghada - a former sarpanch (head of the village Panchayat).

• The PSI advised Yakub, Abdulla and his other companions to get into a tempo (registration- GJ 17X 4122) along with women and children and go to their relatives living in other villages in order to save themselves. Abdulla said that a small mob that was advancing towards them was chased away by the PSI using words of abuse. No shots were fired by the police according to Abdulla. The PSI escorted the tempo, which contained about 50 men women and children, and driven by Sattarbhai Kalu, towards Kuajar village situated 10 kms away from Randhikpur. The drive was a slow one considering the large number of passengers the tempo was carrying. When they reached Kuajar chowkdi (crossing) around 1330 hours the PSI is said to have advised them to save themselves in whichever way they could and left.

• Abdulla, and Yakub got separated when their tempo was attacked on the way to Bariya. Yakub watched his brother being beaten up and set on fire along with the tempo later in the day. Siraj left Randhikpur for Limkheda on foot along with his brother Ayub Nana Patel, son Siraj Rasool and nephew Rasool Ibrahim. Siraj the elder reached Bariya next morning having witnessed the lynching of his nephew at Paalligaam, the hacking of his brother and the shooting of his son at Bhulor Dangariya- all in the course of one long night. Both were later burnt to death by the same mob. Siraj himself was attacked near Bariya but survived bleeding injuries on his head and chest.

• When mobs attacked members of the minority community in Randhikpur the police seem to have focussed their energies on helping them escape the riotous mobs. As a result of this action they succeeded in preventing deaths within the village. But nothing seems to have prevented the complete destruction of the houses and shops belonging to the Muslims. Little was done to provide proper protection to these people. They were left to fend for themselves, which brought them face to face with other mobs that had formed in nearby villages and smaller groups, which were keeping vigil on the main roads. As late as in June more than three months after the incident, the team noticed these burnt structures had not been repaired yet as the minority community had not been able to go back.

• Bilkees Yakub Patel (21) a resident of Randhikpur village in Dahod district was raped on by four men when she was four months pregnant. Members of the upper caste belonging to her own village along with others attacked Randhikpur on March 1. She and sixteen other members from her family ran to escape the fury of the mob. Her baby girl Saleha (3), her mother Halima, her sisters Mumtaz and Munni, her brothers Irfan and Aslam, her uncles Yusuf and Majid, her aunts Sugra and Ameena, her cousins Shamim, Mumtaz and Medina and Shamims son Hussain all ran from the village. They ran from one village to another. Went from Randhikpur to Chundagi, which is 5-6kms away and stayed with Bijal Damor- local MLA. Walked to Kuajher and took shelter in a mosque where Shamim delivered a baby girl. Had to leave soon. Walked to village Kudra and took refuge in adivasis house. They gave Shamim clothes. Then left for Chuparwad and then towards Paniwela. At Paniwela truck of people from Randikpur and some other villages attacked them.

• The madness started.  Her first born, a two-year old daughter was killed by the rapists. Bilkees was raped by three men all of whom she recognized. She was pregnant but the rapists could not care less. Bilkees lay flat on the grass, pretending to be dead, while her 45-year old mother, her two sisters, her two cousins and her sister-in-law were raped and killed. She fell unconscious.

• When she regained consciousness she began her long walk to      safety. It was almost four days from the time she had left home before she was found by a police squad who then took her to     the Limkheda police station in Dahod district. There she narrated her whole story to a hostile police officer. There was no female constable present and the narration of the incident was akin to reliving the whole trauma again.

• The police officer instead of doing his duty related to her the procedure of the medical examination she would have to go through if she reported rape. “After the examination there would be no guarantee of her survival.” What does one expect of an already traumatized rape victim. She was alone and terrified. Her FIR was lodged but it failed to mention her rape. It failed to mention the names of her rapists. They were four of them. Three she knew three by name and the fourth she would recognize if she ever saw him again. But she would not have known as she cannot read or write and the officer concerned did not bother to read out the FIR to her, as he should have dutifully done. From here Bilkees was taken to the Godhra camp completely unaware of the contents of the FIR. Later due to the intervention of a fact-finding team and the District Collector of Panchmahals a second statement was recorded where Bilkees reiterated that she was raped. She also named all the accused.

• Accordingly a medical examination was conducted but six days later. This medical examination was a mere farce. Done more than 72 hours later the MLC did not confirm rape.  First there was a need for timely examination, which was not followed. Further the Code of Criminal Procedure has, in section 53, a general provision on the subject of medical examination of the accused in all cases where such examination would afford evidence of the offence. “Whenever the person of a female is to be examined under this section, the examination shall be made only by, or under the supervision of a female registered practitioner” However, the report of the medical examiner as to the examination of the female victim is also found to be somewhat cursory and does not give adequate information about the material particulars, which are necessary for adjudication as to the various ingredients of section 375.

• The medical examination report was not sent promptly to the investigating officer. And since it does not confirm rape, the police have stubbornly refused to take Bilkees’s account of the rape seriously. No arrests have been made so far. Instead Bilkees has been made the target of ridicule. Eight months later no chargesheet has been filed in Bilkees’s case. The police at Limkheda police station claim that they have not received a copy of her subsequent statement in which she reported her rape and names of the accused and thus no investigation is on the way and no arrests have been made till date.

• The police have always answered that the accused are at large. A final ‘A report’ has been submitted. The Police Station officer may submit a report to a Magistrate in the following three cases. When from the police investigation it appears that no offence has been committed.   When from the police investigation it appears that only a non-cognizable offence has been committed.  When from the police investigation the investigation officer believes that there are not sufficient grounds to investigate or there is not sufficient evidence to justify sending any accused for trial. The Magistrate has to classify such a case and issue an appropriate summary of his order.

• In this case the Magistrate has issued an ‘A Report’ which is True, Undetected (there is no clue whatsoever of the culprits or property or where the accused is known but there is no evidence to justify his being sent up to the Magistrate for trial.  This classification of the final report seems totally absurd as all the accused are known. They are even today living in the village. They will not let Bilkees come back to the village till she drops all the charges or removes the names of the accused. It appears strange in that case when the police say that they have no clue whatsoever of the culprits or property or is not enough evidence to justify presenting the accused before the Magistrate for trial.

• Like Randhikpur, which is situated about 15 km towards the south; Sanjeli (Jhalod taluka) has a history of communal tension. Some 300 Ghanchi muslim and about 80 Bohra families have been living in separate localities of Sanjeli since several generations. Several Bohra families prospered in recent times through the transport and money lending businesses. The Sunni Muslim families include small-scale landowning farmers, landless agricultural labourers, petty shopkeepers, and traders in livestock and truck and tempo drivers. Sanjeli is surrounded by several villages of Adivasis who have been badly affected by drought conditions prevalent since four years. Most of them are small-scale farmers barely able to eke out a living. The VHP along with the Bajrang Dal has been active in this small town since 1995. In 1998 the VHP distributed pamphlets objecting to inter-religious marriages between a couple of adivasi women and Muslim men. An attack on the Muslim localities forced them to flee their homes. They were able to return only after several rounds of negotiations conducted over a period of two months.

• Sanjeli had witnessed at least one incident of serious communal violence in recent memory – a good reason why the personnel stationed at the police outpost in the Sanjeli should have been more pro-active in preventing communal violence as required by The Bombay Police Act 1951, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the 1997 Ministry of Home Affairs Guidelines for Promoting Communal Harmony described in the previous chapter. Furthermore, saffron flags were hoisted atop the shops and houses belonging to the Hindu community several days before the Godhra incident. As no festival was round the corner this development alone should have set of alarm bells in the minds of the police posted at Sanjeli. The reasons for displaying such visible symbols of community identity should have been investigated and known troublemakers sternly warned of the consequences of any adventurism they might be planning. The local administration should have brought leaders of both communities together and secured firm undertakings for good behaviour. Members of the minority community do not recollect any such meeting in Sanjeli prior to the outbreak of violence.

• Neighbouring Randhikpur was affected by communal violence on the 27^th night itself and its residents had fled for their lives the next day. It is highly unlikely that the police posted at Jhalod town, which has wireless communication facility, and those at Sanjeli outpost, which has a telephone connection, did not get to know of the violence that had erupted in their neighbourhood. But nothing much seems to have been done to prevent the outbreak of violence as evidenced by the events that unfolded on March 1^st onwards.

• The day of Gujarat bandh (February 28^th) passed off peacefully in Sanjeli. On March 1^st - the day of Bharat bandh - some houses of Muslims lying on the outskirts of the town were attacked and set on fire by a small mob but they did not enter the main residential locality of the Muslims. The police personnel posted at the chowki do not seem to have taken any action to nab the miscreants. Imran Ilyasbhai Tura (17) who lives at the eastern end of Sanjeli returned home around 1400 hours after performing namaz at the Islamiya Mohammediya Masjid when a large mob attacked his neighbours. His father Ilyasbhai Tura employed as a driver by the Public Works Department at Jhalod sent the family back to the masjid for safety. He provided shelter to his neighbours Kalubhai and Gafoorbhai whose houses were set on fire by the mob. The attackers are said to have demanded more kerosene from Ilyasbhai but he firmly refused and the standoff continued until 1800 hours. The mob left after the two houses were completely destroyed. It appears that several Muslims living on the outskirts of Sanjeli had taken refuge in the Masjid for the night. In view of the atmosphere of insecurity experienced by the minority community a meeting to calm down tempers, discuss peace and maintain order could have been organised by the local administration. But members of the minority community did not recollect being invited to such a meeting even if it had been held. Most of the Muslims who had taken refuge in the masjid returned to their homes after daybreak.

• On the morning of March 2^nd the Executive Magistrate (mamlatdar) was spotted touring the Muslim dominated areas along with a few policemen in a jeep announcing that an attack on the village was imminent. It was announced that prohibitory orders had been issued and all Muslims were urged to stay back if they valued their lives. Large mobs of several thousand people attacked the village around 9000 hours. However they do not seem to have entered the main bazaar where most of the Muslims took shelter again. It appears that as in Jhalod the prohibitory orders did not have any restraining effect on the attackers. The standoff seems to have continued for several hours and accompanied by heavy stone throwing. A few tempos were also burnt. An SDM from Dahod and a PSI from Jhalod arrived on the spot after these incidents. This indicates that information about the developments were transmitted to the concerned authorities by the local personnel. Members of the minority community who had access to telephones and cell phones also reportedly made frantic calls to the DSP and the Collector at Dahod.

• The presence of the officials did not make much difference and the mobs closed in on the bazaar area by 1600 hours. This indicates that armed police personnel were not available in adequate numbers to disperse the unlawful assembly, which had surrounded Sanjeli with murderous intentions. Several gunshots were fired. Imran’s father Ilyasbhai was shot in the back and he died soon after. Mr. Kalika Kumar Singh - a member of the princely family of Sanjeli who lives in a mansion located near the western corner of the village - watched the mayhem from his balcony with a pair of binoculars. He remarked that several gun toting members of the mob climbed on roof tops and fired at the main bazaar area where the Muslims had gathered. According to him the manner in which they guided the mobs through the narrow lanes suggested that they had been trained well.

• The DSP, Mr. Jadeja is said to have arrived in Sanjeli along with a few more policemen sometime between 1630 and 1730 hours. It is not clear what kind of force was used by the police to disperse these mobs, as the lone FIR registered for incidents of communal violence that occurred in Sanjeli does not illuminate this aspect. The attackers had blocked the main access points to Sanjeli with boulders and tree trunks. The DSP had to seek the intervention of Mr. Kalika Kumar to request the adivasi leaders of the mob to facilitate safe passage for more than 2500 Ghanchi muslims and Bohras who packed themselves into tempos and trucks. According to Murtuza Fakhruddin Lanewala (22) who travelled in an overcrowded, tempo truck several thousand adivasis assembled on both sides of the road and indulged in heavy stone-throwing while the vehicles inched towards Dahod. The convoy took 8 hours to reach Dahod situated at a distance of about 48 km. The DSP is reported to have fired several rounds in the air in order to clear the road, which had been blocked by the stone pelting adivasis. None of them seem to have suffered an injury. A 60-year-old man died when he was hit by the stones hurled at the tempo in which he was travelling. Five children aged between two and five died on the way due to suffocation.

• Murtuza’s tempo suffered a punctured wheel and stopped at Rayaniya village. Some attackers who had been pursuing them pounced upon them and murdered Murtuza’s grandfather, Tyabji alias Fakhruddin Sharafali Garbarwala, his maternal uncle Murtuza Tyabjibhai Garbarwala, maternal aunt Fatimaben and another relative Zenabben Burhanbhai Mulla Mithawala. The team heard rumours spoken in hushed tones about the humiliating end suffered by the two Bohra women mentioned above. The attackers are said to have dragged them to a mosque, gang raped them and burnt them alive with tires around their necks.

• The entire Muslim Kasbah of Sanjeli was vacated within a few hours on March 2^nd. Members of the minority community left their homes with little more than the clothes on their back. With their exit the mobs had a free run of the town. Every house and shop belonging to the Muslims (marked by the absence of saffron flags) was ransacked meticulously. Even electrical fixtures and toilet bowls were not spared. The masjid was desecrated and the minarets pulled down. Filthy slogans were painted on the walls and the holy Quran was torn apart and thrown into a cesspool. Mr. Kalika Kumar Singh remarked that the looting and destruction continued for an entire month. When the team visited Sanjeli in April, repair work had not yet begun. The Muslim Kasba resembled a German town that had been bombed by the Royal Air Force during World War II. The mobs are said to have used gas cylinders and some unidentified incendiary chemical to blast the houses from within. All this happened under the nose of the personnel manning the police outpost. The police had not performed their primary duty of preventing crime.